Legal Protections for Anonymous Speech in Connecticut

Note: This page covers information specific to Connecticut. For general information concerning legal protections for anonymous speech see the Legal Protections for Anonymous Speech section of this guide.

In Connecticut, the law on what test or standard to apply when a plaintiff seeks to uncover the identity of an anonymous Internet speaker is not entirely clear. One court -- La Societe Metro Cash & Carry France v. Time Warner Cable, 2003 WL 22962857 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2003) -- has addressed the issue, but it applied an unusual standard that derives from Connecticut's case law on an obscure procedure known as a "bill of discovery." This case is discussed below:

La Societe Metro Cash & Carry France operates warehouse distribution centers in France. An anonymous Internet user sent an email to several of its regional directors accusing the company of deceptive and unethical business practices. La Societe Metro traced the email account back to Time Warner Cable, and it sought and obtained an order from a French court compelling Time Warner to turn over identifying information about the anonymous emailer. Time Warner notified its subscriber, and counsel for the subscriber then contacted Time Warner, disputing the validity of the French judgment and demanding that Time Warner not turn over any identifying information. Next, La Soceite Metro brought a "bill of discovery" action in Connecticut, naming Time Warner as the defendant. The "bill of discovery" is a procedural device under Connecticut law; it enables a plaintiff to bring an independent action to obtain evidence to be used in another lawsuit (in this case, a lawsuit against the anonymous emailer). Time Warner notified its subscriber of the Connecticut action, and she intervened through counsel to oppose the bill.

The court applied the standard that Connecticut courts traditionally have used in bills of discovery. This standard requires two primary things. First, the plaintiff must show that what it seeks is necessary to mount a claim or defense in another action, and that it has no other way of obtaining the desired material. Somewhat confusingly, the court wrote that a plaintiff "must be able to demonstrate good faith as well as probable cause that the information sought is both material and necessary to [its] action," not making clear whether this was part of the first requirement or the second (discussed below), which also uses the language of "probable cause." Second, the court indicated that a plaintiff must "demonstrate by detailed facts that there is probable cause to bring a potential cause of action." It defined "probable cause" as "knowledge of facts sufficient to justify a reasonable man in the belief that he has reasonable grounds for presenting an action . . . Its existence or nonexistence is determined by the court on the facts found." The court found that La Societe Metro had put forward enough evidence to establish probable cause that it had suffered damages as a result of the defamatory action of the anonymous emailer (potentially under French law), and that it was seeking information about her identity in good faith and not for any improper purpose.

Exactly what all this means is unclear, but we can say for sure that the court required evidence -- not just allegations or subjective good faith -- in order to establish "probable cause." The court held an evidentiary hearing and relied on testimony from one of La Societe Metro's officers, as well as copies of the offending email itself. Thus, it appears that the test applied was not all that different from a "summary judgment" standard like that in Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451 (Del. 2005). That said, the language of the opinion is somewhat ambiguous, and it is hard to predict how it might be interpreted by another court.