No. 5-08-0178

In the Appellate Court of Illinois Fifth Judicial District

REBECCA BROWN, ROBERT FURKIN, and JAMES FURKIN,

Defendants-Appellants,

v.

LOUIS I. MUND,

Plaintiff-Appellee.

Appeal from the Circuit Court of St. Clair County, Illinois,
No. 05-L-83
Twentieth Judicial Circuit, the Honorable Lloyd A. Cueto

SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF OF APPELLANTS REBECCA BROWN, ROBERT FURKIN, AND JAMES FURKIN

Brian King, #6288783
DOWD BENNETT LLP
7733 Forsyth, Suite 1410
St. Louis, Missouri 63105
Telephone: (314) 889-7300
Facsimile: (314) 863-2111

ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED

POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

ARGUMENT

I. The Illinois Citizen Participation Act is a Legitimate Exercise of the General Assembly's Power and is Necessary and Essential for the Protection of Constitutional Rights as Mandated by the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution.

The Illinois legislature, upon official declaration that the guarantees of the U.S. Constitution were being denied in Illinois courts by the strategic filing of lawsuits, passed the Illinois Citizen Participation Act to restore those guarantees. The method by which strategic lawsuits violate constitutional rights is simple: the costs and burdens of defending against a strategic lawsuit impose a de facto penalty upon specific citizens who have exercised constitutional rights and generally deters other citizens from exercising their otherwise inalienable rights. Illinois trial courts, bound by common law principles that afford each lawsuit a presumption of sincerity, lacked sufficient discretionary authority to dismiss strategic suits before they levied an oppressive tax upon the exercise of constitutional rights. As such, the courts became passive and innocent accomplices to a veritable assault on the most supreme law of our country and the sacred liberties it affords every citizen.

The legislature's intervention was desirable – indeed necessary – for vindicating federal constitutional rights. Through its intervention, the legislature restocked the judiciary with a sufficient arsenal and aegis to uphold its obligation under the Supremacy Clause to defend the U.S. Constitution. This legislative action cannot be reasonably marked as an attempted usurpation of the judiciary's power in violation of Illinois' separation of powers doctrine. Conversely, the Illinois Citizen Participation Act reflects the legislature's earnest effort to restore the judiciary's ability in meeting its obligation to uphold the Constitution of the United States and to prevent strategic suits from further

abusing judicial process. For the foregoing reasons, and pursuant to legal authorities outlined below, the Illinois Citizen Participation Act should be upheld as a legitimate and constitutional exercise of legislative action.

A. The General Assembly's promulgation of various methods to combat the proliferation of strategic lawsuits is a legitimate exercise of its legislative power to declare and pursue Illinois public policy goals.

The primary question examined in this brief is whether the Illinois legislature exceeded its authority by designating a procedure by which the Illinois appellate court acquires immediate jurisdiction to review the denial of a motion brought pursuant to the Citizen Participation Act. This question must be answered in the positive if either of the following propositions are deemed true: (1) the legislative act of establishing an appellate procedure over which the Illinois Supreme Court has hitherto asserted exclusive purview represents an attempt to improperly supplant judicial power; or (2) the legislative act of establishing an appellate procedure over which the Illinois Supreme Court has hitherto asserted exclusive purview represents an attempt to improperly enlarge the legislature's power. In order to evaluate these two propositions properly, an examination of the legislature's intent is necessary along with an examination of the breadth of legislative power. These examinations are conducted in turn below.

In construing a statute, a court must ascertain and give effect to the legislature's intent in enacting the statute. Kirwan v. Welch, 133 Ill.2d 163, 165 (Ill.1989). Legislative intent is ascertained primarily from a consideration of the statute's language. Harvey Firemen's Assoc. v. City of Harvey, 75 Ill.2d 358, 363 (Ill.1979). Where the language is clear and unambiguous it will be given effect without resorting to other aids for construction. People v. Boykin, 94 Ill.2d 138, 141 (Ill.1983). A court will, in

determining the General Assembly's intent, consider not only the language of the statute, but also the purpose and necessity for the law, the evils sought to be remedied, and the goals to be achieved. Alvarez v. Pappas**,** 229 Ill.2d 217, 231 (Ill.2008).

Also, a court will "presume that the General Assembly, in enacting legislation, did not intend absurdity, inconvenience or injustice." J.S.A. v. M.H., 224 Ill.2d 182 (Ill.2007). A court should never depart, however, from the plain language of a statute by reading into the statute exceptions, limitations, or conditions which conflict with the clearly expressed legislative intent. Harvey, 75 Ill.2d at 363. Likewise, a statute should be evaluated as a whole, whereby each section is construed as collaborative of every other section. Abrahamson v. Illinois Dept. of Prof. Regulation, 153 Ill.2d 76, 91 (Ill.1992). In determining its validity, a court presumes that the legislature intended to enact a constitutional statute and will construe a statute as constitutional -- if it is reasonable to do so. Gill v. Miller, 94 Ill.2d 52, 56 (Ill.1983). If a statute's construction is doubtful, a court will resolve the doubt in favor of the statute's validity. Mckenzie v. Johnson, 98 Ill.2d 87, 103 (Ill.1983).

The legislative intent of the Illinois Citizen Participation Act is set forth in detail within Section 5 of its provisions (entitled "Public policy"):

> Pursuant to the fundamental philosophy of the American constitutional form of government, it is declared to be the public policy of the state of Illinois that the constitutional rights of citizens and organizations to be involved and participate freely in the process of government must be encouraged and safeguarded with great diligence.
>
> The laws, courts, and other agencies of this State must provide the utmost protection for the free exercise of these rights to petition, speech, association, and government participation.

> It is in the public interest and it is the purpose of this Act to strike a balance between the rights of persons to file lawsuits for injury and the constitutional rights of persons to petition, speak freely, associate freely, and otherwise participate in government; to protect and encourage public participation in government to the maximum extent permitted by law; to establish an efficient process for identification and adjudication of SLAPPs; and to provide attorney's fees and costs to prevailing movants.

735 ILCS 110/5. The procedure the Act creates is set forth in Section 15 (entitled "Applicability") and Section 20 (entitled "Motion procedure and standards"):

> This Act applies to any motion to dispose of a claim in a judicial proceeding on the grounds that the claim is based on, relates to, or is in response to any act or acts of the moving party in furtherance of the moving party's rights of petition, speech, association, or to otherwise participate in government.
>
> Acts in furtherance of the constitutional rights to petition, speech, association, and participation in government are immune from liability, regardless of intent or purpose, except when not genuinely aimed at procuring favorable government action, result, or outcome.

735 ILCS 110/15.

> On the filing of any motion as described in Section 15, a hearing and decision on the motion must occur within 90 days after notice of the motion is given to the respondent. An appellate court shall expedite any appeal or other writ, whether interlocutory or not, from a trial court order denying that motion or from a trial court's failure to rule on that motion within 90 days after that trial court order or failure to rule.

735 ILCS 110/20.

The foregoing provisions collectively state the legislature's intent, declare the public policy of Illinois informing its intent, and provide the several means of effectuating that intent. A question has, nonetheless, arisen as to whether the latter clause indicates an intent which is altogether unstated in the Act: an excessive and illegitimate abuse of legislative power in violation of the Illinois Constitution's separation of powers

clause. Because the means the legislature adopted for achieving its intent are consistent with the public policy it clearly and unambiguously announces, there is no indication that the legislature intended anything other than to provide the "utmost protection" for constitutional rights that strategic lawsuits would otherwise continue to assail. Boykin, 94 Ill.2d at 141 (requiring a construing court to look primarily to the statute's language for determining the legislature's actual intent).

As one reads the Act's provisions as a whole, it becomes clear that the procedural mechanisms within it constitute the legislature's means of balancing the common law rights of plaintiffs in civil suits against the federal rights of citizens conferred by the U.S. Constitution. As the public policy section holds, the Act intends to protect the latter person's constitutional rights to the "maximum extent permitted by law." 735 ILCS 110/5. According to the plain language of the statute, striking this balance within the maximum extent permitted by law is "in the public interest" and "is the purpose" of the Act. Id.

The methods by which the Act achieves this are four-fold. First, the Act updates, clarifies, and codifies preexisting common law regarding constitutional rights to reflect the proper standard for determining the genuineness of the asserted rights. Second, the Act suspends discovery procedures once a citizen asserts that the lawsuit is directed at the exercise of constitutional rights. Third, the Act provides an accelerated timeline wherein the strategic plaintiff must meet its traditional common law burden of proof by persuading the trial court that no constitutional rights are implicated. Fourth and finally, the Act confers upon the appellate court immediate authority to determine whether the trial court has met its duty to properly and promptly exonerate constitutional rights from

the encumbrance of strategic litigation. As explained in greater detail below, these four methods work collaboratively to achieve the legislature's purpose and intent of combating the evils of strategic suits, and thus must be construed as consistent with that purpose and intent. See Alvarez, 229 Ill.2d at 231 (requiring a construing court to consider not only the language of the statute, but also the goals to be achieved in light of the evils that the statute aims to remedy).

The first of the four methods achieves the legislature's intent by providing the circuit courts sufficient and clear authority to evaluate assertions of constitutional exercises and deem them as genuine *vel non*. Pursuant to its understanding that the common law does not afford a robust enough legal doctrine to adequately protect constitutional rights against abusive claims, the legislature modified the proof necessary to sustain any common law claim interposed at the expense of those rights. The modification of proof, requiring a showing that the exercise of rights was "genuinely aimed at procuring favorable government action, result, or outcome," brought Illinois common law up to date by aligning it with the guarantees of liberty afforded by our country's highest law – the U.S. Constitution. The legislature's method of codifying the common law to empower the circuit courts is therefore entirely consistent with its goal of protecting constitutional rights to the highest extent permitted by law.

The second method achieves the goal of limiting burdensome discovery costs, which strategic suits impose as a penalty upon valid exercises of constitutional rights. The legislature created this provision to overcome the traditional common law principle that a plaintiff will be permitted to take discovery prior to meeting its burdens of production and persuasion. To be sure, one of the mechanisms by which strategic

lawsuits successfully discourage rights is by imposing upon targeted citizens a financial burden sufficient to deter them, as well as other citizens, from exercising their rights in the future. The second method forecloses strategic lawsuits from discouraging the exercise of constitutional rights by relieving targeted citizens from costly and invasive discovery procedures, which typically include defending depositions, answering written interrogatories, and producing documents demanded by the strategic plaintiff. By cutting the discovery procedure off until a determination of the genuineness of the exercise of constitutional rights, the legislature divested strategic suits of what is arguably their most pernicious means of assaulting the U.S. Constitution. Thus, the discovery suspension procedure is crucial to the legislature's goal of reducing the unacceptable consequences of strategic suits.

The legislature employed the third method, requiring a strategic plaintiff to satisfy an initial burden of proof prior to reaching a jury, to promote the early detection of strategic suits by the courts for dismissal before costs associated with trial preparation reach unacceptable levels. This provision is necessary to give the courts sufficient power to examine the nature of the constitutional rights asserted and to determine whether there is sufficient evidence to justify a trial by jury to scrutinize those rights further. Mounting a defense for presentation to a jury entails onerous costs and large blocks of preparation time. Indeed, strategic suits thrive in part because the targeted citizens will want to avoid an adverse judgment and will therefore have little choice other than to spend the time and money necessary to ensure exoneration through witness preparation, document reviews, *voir dire*, and other pretrial processes that competent trial lawyers typically undertake. The legislature, by empowering a court to dismiss a case upon a finding that the strategic

plaintiff will not overcome the immunities afforded by the U.S. Constitution, relieved unfairly targeted citizens from having to develop a costly defense for achieving the same ultimate result. By preventing the costs of trial preparation from accruing, the third method is consistent with the legislature's intent to reduce the grievous impact of strategic suits.

The fourth method implants an accelerated procedure by which the appellate court will intervene in a suit attacking constitutional exercises and determine whether that suit is repugnant to the U.S. Constitution. The provision reflects the understanding that the circuit courts are less-equipped than the appellate court to strike a balance between strategic plaintiffs and the U.S. Constitution. The appellate court has traditionally enjoyed greater authority to declare how a legal determination in a particular controversy either avails or diminishes the public interest. While circuit courts are furnished with sufficient authority to apply law to facts, as a matter of function and discretion, they may only apply the laws as announced in decisions by superior courts. Without the ability to make law, and in the absence of well-established precedent to give them direction, the trial courts were unable to properly strike a balance in favor of constitutional rights and in derogation of strategic lawsuits.

The power differential between the trial and appellate courts was not lost on the legislature. Indeed, the legislature could not have hoped to reduce strategic suits by relying solely upon the power of the trial courts when that limited power made the same courts vulnerable to the "abuse of the judicial process" identified in the Act's public policy section. By furnishing the appellate courts with immediate jurisdiction to correct those abuses, the legislature provided a mechanism for courts to combat the loathsome

judicial abuse that has become a cottage industry for some litigants and that has been destructive toward rights afforded under the U.S. Constitution. This fourth method is consistent with the legislature's goal of enlisting the "laws, courts, and other agencies of this State [to] provide the utmost protection for the free exercise of these rights[.]" Id. It should therefore be construed along with other provisions as collaborative of the preceding three goals and illuminative of the legislature's intent to prevent strategic suits from penalizing the exercise of constitutional rights. See Abrahamson, 153 Ill.2d at 91 (requiring courts to construe statute as a whole when determining legislative intent).

While the fourth method bears a clear relation to the achievement of the legislative intent announced in the public policy section, a question remains as to whether this procedural mechanism also reflects a legislative effort to exceed its legislative power at the expense of judicial power. However, when determining the intent of the legislature, the construing court must look primarily at the statute's language and secondarily at the purpose and necessity for the law, the evils sought to be remedied, and the goals to be achieved. When the appellate procedure provision is considered in light of the legislature's goals of remedying the evils of strategic suits, it becomes clear that the fourth method is absolutely necessary for preventing the continued abuse of the judicial process.

B. The General Assembly's promulgation of appellate procedural provisions reflects neither an effort to improperly usurp the judiciary's power nor an effort to exceed its broad authority to pass laws that declare and pursue Illinois public policy goals

The legislature did not attempt to disturb judicial power when it passed this Act. As the case law counsels, a court must give the Act such a construction as to affirm its constitutional validity if reasonably possible. See Mckenzie, 98 Ill.2d at 103. Likewise, a construing court may not impute any intention to the legislature that the statute's clear and ambiguous language does not support. Boykin, 94 Ill.2d at 141. It is for the foregoing reasons and others offered below that the Act itself cannot be fairly viewed as an attempt to divest Illinois courts of power.

The appellate procedure provision under review here is manifestly reasonable in pursuit of the legislature's goal of affording judicial protection to constitutional rights that the trial courts have struggled to protect in the past. Certainly, where the trial courts have failed under the weight of cumbersome common law principles that constrain their discretion to dismiss strategic suits, the appellate court is likely to succeed by virtue of its wider grant of authority to pass upon questions of public policy as announced by the legislature. The legislature therefore granted additional powers to the courts to address the various abuses of the judicial process identified in Section 110/5. Concluding that the statute intended to decrease judicial power would not be a reasonable construction of this statute because the statute identifies as one of its stated goals the prevention of strategic suits from further abusing the judiciary. See Peterson v. Wallach, 198 Ill.2d 439, 466 (Ill.2002) ("We will not depart from the plain language of a statute by reading into it exceptions, limitations or conditions that conflict with the express legislative intent").

Further, any skeptical construction of the statute would comprise an impermissible and counterintuitive presumption that the General Assembly intended "absurdity, inconvenience or injustice" when it *actually reinforced* judicial power to prevent the inconvenience, injustice, and absurdities presented by strategic suits. J.S.A. v. M.H., 224 Ill.2d 182. Owing to the statute's language, goals, and "express legislative intent," and pursuant to Illinois canons of statutory construction, the Act should be upheld as the legislature's reasonable and constitutional effort to achieve the necessary goal of thwarting strategically filed lawsuits. See Presley v. P. & S. Grain Co., Inc., 289 Ill.App.3d 453, 462 (Ill.App.1997) ("Courts should avoid construing a statute in a manner that raises substantial questions concerning the statute's constitutional validity."); Wallach, 198 Ill.2d at 466 ("We will not depart from … the express legislative intent").

Additionally, the conclusion that the appellate procedures provision alternatively reflects the legislature's underlying ambition to exceed its own power is also erroneous when these provisions are read in light of the statute's expressly stated public policy goals. It cannot be gainsaid that the legislature, as opposed to the judiciary, is exclusively vested with the constitutional power to pursue public policy by striking a balance between conflicting political interests. See Dixon Distributing Co. v. Hanover Ins. Co., 244 Ill.App.3d 837 (Ill.App.1993) ("[E]stablishing public policy may entail the balancing of political interests. This is a function of the legislature, not the courts"). Because the legislature here announced the public policy of Illinois regarding the constitutional crisis created by the rise of strategic suits, Illinois courts must necessarily defer to and adopt the same determination of public policy. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Smith, 197 Ill.2d 369 (2001) ("This court may not establish a public policy which is contrary to the

public policy that the Illinois legislature has determined is appropriate for the State of Illinois."). To that end, the Illinois legislature acted squarely within its constitutional authority when it declared that the protection of federal constitutional rights is in the public interest and promulgated "reasonable measures" in balancing the political interests involved. Pozner v. Mauck, 73 Ill.2d 250 (Ill.1978) ("Where a need affecting the public interest is present, the State may implement reasonable measures to meet that need."). The resulting legislation, including the appellate procedural provisions thereof, does not constitute an excessive exercise of legislative power under the Illinois Constitution. See Reed v. Farmers Ins. Group, 188 Ill.2d 168 ("In relation to the judicial branch, the General Assembly, which speaks through the passage of legislation, occupies a superior position in determining public policy.").

Furthermore, the Act does not represent any ambition on the part of the General Assembly to increase its power at the expense of the judiciary's power. Due to the fact that the legislature already has sufficient authority to pass legislation defining, limiting, or even abrogating common law causes of actions, one cannot logically maintain that the salutary extension of jurisdiction to permit judicial construction of constitutional rights reflects ambition to exceed its broad authority. Expanding the judiciary's ability to confront the abuses occasioned by the scourge of strategic lawsuits is a display of deference when considered against the backdrop of the legislative ability to summarily remove any runaway cause of action from the jurisdiction of the courts altogether. There are no indications here that the legislature acted for the purpose of expanding its own power. In sum, the Act does nothing to offend the separation of powers doctrine in the Illinois Constitution. See People v. Marshall, 1 Gillman 672, 6 Ill. 672 (Ill.1844)

("[W]here the consequences of a particular construction of a constitution or law would render its operation mischievous, that construction should be avoided, provided it is susceptible to a different one").

C. To the extent the Illinois Constitution conflicts with or otherwise operates to thwart the legislature's efforts to uphold the U.S. Constitution, the Supremacy Clause requires the Illinois Constitution to yield to those efforts.

The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution holds:

> This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.

U.S. Const., art. VI, cl. 2. The U.S. Constitution, by virtue of the Supremacy Clause, undoubtedly takes precedence over any state statute, state constitution, or state common law principle that would otherwise frustrate its mandate to guarantee inalienable rights. See Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239, 245 (1942) (stating that "the Supremacy Clause imposes on state courts a constitutional duty to proceed in such manner that all the substantial rights of the parties under controlling federal law [are] protected."). The Supremacy Clause mandates that state courts uphold federal constitutional rights – even if doing so forsakes the state laws upon which their jurisdiction rests. See People v. Lawton, 212 Ill.2d 285, 300-301 (Ill.2004) ("[T]he Judges of the State Courts are required to take an oath to support that Constitution, and they are bound by it and the laws of the United States … as the supreme law of the land, anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.") (quoting Robb v. Connolly, 111 U.S. 624, 637 (1884)). Further, the Illinois Supreme

Court has explicitly held that Illinois courts are not permitted to avoid their duty to uphold the U.S. Constitution while awaiting an express authorization from the General Assembly to do what the Supremacy Clause requires by default. See id. ("If implementation of federal constitutional guarantees were dependent on action by state legislatures, states would have the power to prevent citizens from asserting their federal constitutional rights in state courts simply by sitting back and doing nothing. Under our system of government, such a result is impermissible.").

On the other hand, several case law decisions may be advanced in support of the proposition that an act by the legislature that affords the appellate courts additional jurisdiction is repugnant to the Illinois Constitution. See e.g., Almgren v. Rush-Presyterian-St. Luke's Med. Center, 162 Ill.2d 205, 213 (Ill.1994); In re Marriage of Lentz, 79 Ill.2d 400, 404 (Ill.1980); People ex rel. Stamos v. Jones, 40 Ill.2d 62, 66 (Ill.1968). At cursory glance, these cases may give readers the false impression that the legislature can never provide the appellate courts with a means of obtaining jurisdiction for the purpose of addressing a compelling state interest. Nonetheless, these cases are distinguishable to the extent that they do not involve the legislature's effort to uphold constitutional rights, which is an effort compelled by the Supremacy Clause.

The fact that the legislature here acted to give courts greater power and ability to uphold constitutional rights dictates that all cases asserted against that action must defer to the insuperable duties imposed upon the legislature and the courts alike by the U.S. Constitution. Indeed, the Illinois Supreme Court has before authorized departure from the formal operation of the appellate procedural rules in cases otherwise warranting appellate review. See e.g., Weekly v. Skahan, 178 Ill.2d 577 (1998). Cf. Berg v. Allied

Security, Inc., 193 Ill.2d 186, 194 (2000) ("Although [Supreme Court Rule 303] utilizes language which makes its requirements seem mandatory, our court has recently recognized that the rule's requirement may be relaxed.") (Freeman, J., specially concurring). If the Illinois Supreme Court has made case-by-case exceptions on the basis of the necessity of appellate review, then it should surely defer to the legislative effort here to promote the express public policy of Illinois and facilitate the duty imposed upon the General Assembly and the Illinois courts to protect constitutional rights to the "maximum extent permitted by law." See 735 ILCS 110/5 (declaring it the public policy of Illinois that the "laws, courts, and other agencies of this State must provide the utmost protection for the free exercise of the rights to petition, speech, association, and government participation."); Heckendorn v. First Nat'l Bank of Ottawa, 19 Ill.2d 190, 195 (Ill.1960) ("It is not our place to criticize the policy determination of the legislature"). Any contrary outcome would needlessly exalt formalism over substantive justice and cause further injustice to citizens who are unfairly targeted for exercising rights guaranteed under the U.S. Constitution. It would be a veritable travesty of justice if the Illinois Constitution were to serve as a stumbling block to the legislature's earnest effort to vindicate federal constitutional rights. See Lawton, 212 Ill.2d at 299 ("Doing justice under the law is this court's highest obligation"). Such an outcome cannot be countenanced under the Supremacy Clause, which requires that no Illinois constitutional, common law doctrine, or technical jurisdictional defect may interfere with the protection of constitutional rights afforded by this country's most supreme law. See id. at 301 ("[T]he class of those litigants who allege that their own constitutional rights have been violated, and who at the same time have no effective means other than the judiciary to

enforce these rights, must be able to invoke the existing jurisdiction of the courts for the protection of their justiciable constitutional rights").

For all of the reasons provided above, and pursuant to the principles outlined in various legal authorities presented above, the Illinois Citizen Participation Act should be deemed a necessary, valid, and constitutional exercise of the Illinois General Assembly.

Date: September 17, 2008

Respectfully submitted,

REBECCA BROWN, ROBERT FURKIN, and JAMES FURKIN

By:_____

Brian King, #6288783
Dowd Bennett, LLP
7733 Forsyth Blvd, Suite 1410
St. Louis, Missouri 63105
Telephone: (314) 889-7300
Facsimile: (314) 863-2111

CERTIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE

The undersigned, an attorney, certifies that the foregoing brief conforms to the requirements of Supreme Court Rules 341(a) and (b). The length of this brief is 20 pages.

_____

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned, an attorney, certifies that three (3) copies of the foregoing document were served, via first class U.S. mail, postage prepaid, this 17th day of September 2008, upon the following:

B. Jay Dowling
Sterling and Dowling, P.C.
6 Canty Lane
Fairview Heights, IL 62208

Timothy J. Reichardt
Behr, McCarter & Potter, PC
7777 Bohnhomme Ave, Suite 1810
St. Louis, MO 63105

_____